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HYPNOSIS, TRUTH DRUGS, AND THE POLYGRAPH

HYPNOSIS, TRUTH DRUGS, AND THE POLYGRAPH: AN ANALYSIS
OF THEIR USE AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE COURTS
Hypnosis, narcosis, and the polygraph are scientific tools that have been
the subject of much controversy concerning their use in the criminal investigatory process and the admissibility of their fruits into evidence. Much of
this debate has concerned the admissibility of evidence derived from their
use when offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. To a large extent
other uses of these devices and the information gathered therefrom have
received only cursory treatment. This note presents the historical and
technical developments in the three areas and surveys the instances in which
information derived from their use is accepted by the courts. The rationale
for treating hypnosis, narcosis, and the polygraph together is that many
objections, such as the lack of reliability and the impingement on constitutional safeguards, to the use of this type of information are common to all
three. The focus will be placed on the criminal defendant with a view toward
the extent and form in which the courts will accept evidence derived from
hypnosis, truth drugs, and the polygraph.
THE POLYGRAPH

Historical and Technical Background
In 1895, Cesare Lombroso made the first attempt to detect deception by
a scientific device." His approach was to measure fluctuations in blood pressure and pulse rate as indicative of the truth or falsity of the subject's
response. In 1915, Benussi, and shortly thereafter, Brutt, began experimenting
with an analysis of changes in respiration and their relation to deception. 2
John Larson designed a more sophisticated instrument, which he called the
"polygraph." It was capable of measuring blood pressure, pulse rate, and
respiration simultaneously. 3 Galvanic skin response, which is the measure
of "changes or variations in the conductance of external current between the
palmar and dorsal surfaces of the subject's hand (or of the fingers, et cetera) ,24
was added to the factors measured by Leonarde Keeler. 5 John Reid further
refined the polygraph by adding the capability of measurement of muscular
activity.6
The theory of the polygraph is based on the assumption that a definite
relationship exists between lying and certain physical responses.7 According
1. F. INBAU & J. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 2 (3d ed. 1953)
[hereinafter cited as INBAU &REID].
2. Id. at 3.
3. Larson, Modification of the Marston Deception Test, 12 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 390
(1921).
4. INBAU & REID, supranote 1, at 99.
5. Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70
YALE L.J. 694, 697-98 (1961).
6. INBAU & REI, supra note 1, at 4.
7. Skolnick, supra note 5, at 700.
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to the theory, lying causes a fear or anxiety that translates itself into certain
physical reactions - changes in the blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration, or
galvanic skin response of the subject, which are recorded by the polygraph."
An examiner draws a conclusion as to the truth or falsity of the subject's
response through interpretation of the recorded data. That this is a difficult
process requiring a highly skilled operator is indicated by a glance at the
factors that may complicate the examiner's interpretation. The chief difficulties in the diagnosis of deception by the polygraph are: (1) extreme nervousness, (2) mental abnormality, (3) physical abnormality, (4) unresponsiveness, and (5) muscular pressure or controlled breathing.9 Commentators are
quick to point out other sources of error such as the psychological bias of the
examinero and the chance that the examiner may unwittingly give misleading
cues on crucial questions."
The critical link in the process is the examiner. He has the task of
detecting error producing factors and compensating for them in his examination technique and data interpretation. This responsibility places a high
premium on training and skill. However, there is serious disagreement as to
the extent and type of training an examiner should receive. Suggestions
range from six-month courses 12 to training equivalent to that of a psychiatrist. 3 Proponents of the lie detector admit that a large portion of the
examiners lack sufficient training by almost any standard 4 and that this in
conjunction with the lack of standardization in the instrument used makes
the results unsuitable for court use.' 5 They attempt to show statistically a
ninety-five per cent accuracy in the determination of guilt or innocence, four
percent indefinite results, and only one per cent error under the most favorable conditions.16 Some advocates of the polygraph claim even greater
accuracy.' 7 Skeptics, however, question both the accuracy of the statistical
results due to unknown error,' and the basic physiological theory itself:' 9
In sum, academic psychology and psychophysiology challenge both
substantive assumptions underlying lie-detection theory: the assumption of a regular relationship between lying and emotional states,
8. Id. at 699.
9. INBAU & REID, supra note 1,at 64-65.
10. Skolnick, supra note 5, at 711.
11. Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie Detector,"40 IowA L. Rav. 440, 451 (1955).
12. INBAU &,REID, supra note 1, at 115.
13. Skolnick, supra note 5, at 707, believes the task of the examiner is actually more
difficult than that of a psychiatrist. A psychiatrist determines only whether a person has
a tendency for lying where the examiner must determine if the subject is lying in that
particular instance.
14. INBAU & REID, supra note 1, at 114; Arther, The Lie Detector-Is it of Any Value?,
FED.PROB., Dec. 1960, at 36, 39.
15. INBAU & REID, supra note I, at 128.
16. Id. at I1.
17. Arther, supra note 14.
18. Burack, A Critical Analysis of the Theory, Method, and Limitations of the "Lie
Detector," 46 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 414, 421 (1955); Levitt, supra note 11.
19. Skolnick, supra note 5, at 703.
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and the assumption of a regular and measurable relationship between
emotional change and autonomic activity.Admissibility of Results as Direct Evidence
Since the first reported case dealing with the question, 20 courts have
consistently excluded results of lie detector tests from evidence in both civil 2'
and criminal 2 cases. The reasons generally advanced to support this exclusion
are judicial precedent (lack of scientific acceptance of the polygraph as a
reliable instrument in ascertaining truth or falsity) 23 and failure of the proponent to lay a proper foundation through expert testimony.2 4 Ancillary
reasons such as the belief ,that the results may have an undue influence on
the jury,25 the impossibility of cross-examining the lie detector, 26 and usurpation of the jury's factfinding role27 have also been suggested. This exclusion
has been extended to the implication of test results as well, 28 and in either
case admission, whether urged by the state or defendant, constitutes reversible
error that cannot be cured by instruction. 29 This refusal is given further
20. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
21. Gideon v. Gideon, 153 Cal. App. 2d 541, 314 P.2d 1011 (1957); Molino v. Board of
Pub. Safety, 154 Conn. 368, 225 A.2d 805 (1966) (dictum); Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50
N.W.2d 172 (1951); Parker v. Friendt, 99 Ohio App. 329, 118 N.E.2d 216 (1954).
22. United States v. Tremont, 351 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1965); McCroskey v. United States,
339 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1965); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Kaminski
v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953); State v. Brown, 177 So. 2d 532 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965);
State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); People v. Frechette, 380 Mich. 64, 155
N.W.2d 830 (1968); People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); State v. Perry,
274 Minn. 1, 142 N.W.2d 573 (1966); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949);
State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45,
230 P.2d 495 (1951); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933). Only one case
has admitted the results of a lie detector test as evidence, People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3
N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens County Ct. 1938). However, this was impliedly overruled by People
v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
23. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d
339 (Fla. 1953); People v. Frechette, 380 Mich. 64, 155 N.W.2d 830 (1968); State v. Perry,
274 Minn. 1, 142 N.W.2d 573 (1966); State v. Amwine, 67 N.J. Super. 483, 171 A.2d
124 (Super. Ct. 1961).
24. People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181,
188 S.W.2d 43 (1945); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) (concurring
opinion); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
25. People v. Frechette, 380 Mich. 64, 155 N.W.2d 830 (1968); State v. Perry, 274 Minn.
1, 142 N.W.2d 573 (1966); State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945); State v. Foye,
254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961).
26. State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37
N.W.2d 593 (1949); State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961).
27. People v. Schiers, 329 P.2d I (Cal. 1958) (dissenting opinion); see Silving, Testing
of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HAav. L. Rv. 683 (1956).
28. People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950); State v. Amwine, 67
N.J. Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (Super. Ct. 1961); State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 SXE.2d
169 (1961).
29. State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961). Contra, People v. Schiers, 160
Cal. App. 2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 (1958). Witness for the prosecution testified that he told
the defendant the results were unfavorable. The district court of appeals held that the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 9
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

support by experts in the field of lie detection who discourage its wholesale
acceptance. 30 The question thus raised focuses on the appropriateness of
total exclusion. Experts in the field do recognize the effectiveness of the
polygraph when used under the most favorable conditions.31 The more
logical result is reached by courts that in each case give the proponent of
the evidence the opportunity to show that the factors of reliability are
present. 32 If it is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that these
factors 33 are present, the reliability hurdle should be deemed crossed. If there
are no prevailing constitutional or policy objections, the evidence should be
admitted.

34

One exception to the exclusionary rule concerns the effect of stipulations
entered into by the prosecution and defense as to the taking of the test, the
qualifications of the examiner, and the admissibility of the results without
objection by the adversely affected party.35 Courts view such stipulations
strictly and require that they extend to the admissibility of the evidence. 36
Although this exception is not universally recognized, 37 the trend is toward
recognition. Jursidictions that recognize this exception approach it in two
different ways. Some look no further than the stipulation.38 Florida appears not
to be in this group. 39 Once the stipulation is presented to the court, results
trial judge's curative instructions were sufficient. Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24 (D.C.
Cir. 1951). The results of a lie detector test were admitted for the sole purpose of proving
a voluntary confession.
30. INBAU & REID, supra note 1, at 128; Inbau, Detection of Deception Technique Admitted as Evidence, 26 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 262, 270 (1936).
31. INBAIJ & REID, supra note 1, at 111; Arther, supra note 14.
32. People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181,
188 S.W.2d 43 (1945); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) (concurring
opinion); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
33. Factors of reliability are a satisfactory mental and physical condition of the subject
and a competent examiner. The subject should not be extensively interrogated or physically
abused before the lie detector examination. The qualifications for a competent examiner
are generally set out in INBAU & REIm, supra note 1, at 114-16.
34. See Herman, The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25 OHIo
ST. L.J. 1 (1964). Professor Herman advocates a case-by-case analysis for reliability factors
in the areas of hypnosis, truth drugs, and the polygraph.
35. Herman v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 33 (C.D. Cal. 1966); State v. Valdez,
91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937
(1948); State v. Brown, 177 So. 2d 532 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa
1334, 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964); State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960);
State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1957) (the court implied that if there had been
a stipulation the results would have been admissible).
36. People v. Zazzeta, 27 Ill. 2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963); People v. Potts, 74 Ill.
App. 2d 301, 220 N.E.2d 251 (1966); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); cf.
Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957) (court would not give effect to the
stipulation because it was oral and did not extend to the qualifications of the examiner).
37. Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951); State v. Trimble, 68 N.M.
406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961); LeFevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1948).
38. Herman v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 33 (C.D. Cal. 1966); People v. Houser,
85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948); State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334, 125 N.W.2d 825
(1964).
39. State v. Brown, 177 So.2d 532 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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of the test are admissible. No inquiry is made into the presence or absence
of reliability factors. The rationale of this approach seems to be grounded
in theory that contracts to alter or waive established rules of evidence are
valid and enforceable in the absence of fraud or coercion.- This approach
seems to beg the question. The biggest failing of the polygraph is its unreliability in most instances. The fact that the parties have stipulated to its
reliability does not affect its actual reliability. The risk of injustice is
apparent. Picture the innocent defendant who willingly and forcefully
demands a polygraph test and stipulates to the admission of the results
because he is sure it will exonerate him, yet the result is unfavorable.
A sounder approach is represented by jurisdictions following Valdez v.
State41 where the defendant entered into a written agreement with the county
attorney stipulating that the results of a lie detector test would be admissible.
The results were unfavorable to the defendant, and over his objection the
polygraph operator was permitted to testify to this effect at the trial. Upon
certification of the question of admissibility, the Arizona supreme court held
that the lie detector had developed to such an extent that the results were
probative enough to be admitted into evidence upon stipulation in order to
corroborate other evidence of defendant's participation in the crime or, if
the defendant testified, to corroborate or impeach his own testimony. Several
42
qualifications were placed on this admission:
(1) that the stipulation pertain to admissibility,
(2) that the trial judge may exclude the evidence if he feels that
factors of unreliability are present,
(3) that the opposing party be given an opportunity for full
cross-examination of the operator,
(4) that the jury be instructed that the evidence does not tend
to prove or disprove any element of the crime, but only the defendant's
belief at the time of the examination, and
(5) that the jury should determine how heavily to weigh the
evidence.
The Arizona court has faced the reliability problem directly; however,
its presumption is one of admissibility rather than inadmissibility. By
limiting its use to corroboration and impeachment the court has also insured
that the evidence obtained through the use of the polygraph will not be the
sole evidence of guilt. This straightforward approach may provide the wedge
for a general extension of this type of reasoning into cases where there has
been no stipulation yet the factors militating towards reliability are present.

40. Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal
Investigation, 62 YA.E L. J. 315, 328 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Dession]; Note, Contracts
To Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HAIv. L. REV. 138 (1932).
41. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302, 189 N.E.2d
260 (1963); People v. Potts, 74 Ill. App. 2d 301, 220 N.E.2d 251 (1966).
42. State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962).
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Evidence of Defendant's Willingness or Refusal To Submit
to a Polygraph Test
In an attempt to accomplish indirectly what is not permitted directly,
counsel frequently attempt to show, either through comment or as evidence,
a defendant's willingness or refusal to submit to a lie detector test. Courts
have held such comments and the admission of this type of evidence to be
error for several reasons:
(1) Since the results of lie detector tests are inadmissible, the fact
of defendant's willingness
or refusal to submit to the examination is
43

likewise inadmissible.

4
(2) This type of information has an adverse effect on the jury."
(3) Unwillingness to take a lie detector test has no probative value

in showing a general consciousness of guilt.4 5 The reasoning here is that

a defendant might refuse to take
of its unreliability.
(4) Willingness to take a lie
in showing a general consciousness
express his desire to take the test
inadmissibility of the results.

the test simply because he is aware
detector test has no probative value
of innocence.46 The defendant could
without fear because of the general

Although the courts find such comment or the admission of this type of
evidence to be error, it is not always prejudicial error requiring reversal. The
determination of prejudicial error rests on a consideration of a number of
factors. If the case is a close one with the evidence being only mildly persuasive of guilt, the error will usually be deemed prejudicial due to the chance
that it could provide the added weight necessary for conviction. 47 Conversely,
if the evidence is overwhelmingly against the defendant, the error will usually
not require reversal. 48 If the judge gives adequate curative instructions,
appellate courts will generally not consider the error prejudicial; 49 however,
43. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bros., Inc., 289 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1961); People v. Carter,
48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); Mills v. People, 139 Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998 (1959);
Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953); State v. Chang, 46 Hawaii 22, 374 P.2d 5
(1962); State v. Emory, 190 Kan. 406, 375 P.2d 585 (1962); Penn v. Commonwealth, 417
S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1967); State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 52 N.W.2d 458 (1952); State v.
Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962); People v. Neumuller, 29 App. Div. 2d 886, 288
N.Y.S.2d 511 (1968); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442 (1956).
44. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bros., Inc., 289 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1961); State v. Green,
254 Iowa 1379, 121 N.W.2d 89 (1963); State v. Emory, 190 Kan. 406, 375 P.2d 585 (1962);
State v. Perry, 274 Minn. 1, 142 N.W.2d 573 (1966); State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d
655 (1962); State v. Britt, 235 S.C. 395, 111 S.E.2d 669 (1959).
45. People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); Johnson v. State, 166 So.
2d 798 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964) (dictum); State v. Green, 254 Iowa 1379, 121 N.W.2d 89 (1963).
46. People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); Penn v. Commonwealth, 417
S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1967); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442 (1956).
47. Mills v. People, 139 Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998 (1959); State v. Kolander, 236 Minn.
209, 52 N.W.2d 458 (1952); State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1952).
48. People v. Parrella, 158 Cal. App. 2d 140, 322 P.2d 83 (1958); Barber v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 241, 142 S.E.2d 484 (1965).
49. Marable v. State, 203 Tenn. 440, 313 S.W.2d 451 (1958).
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if the instructions are equivocal or the information particularly damaging
due to the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the instructions will
be to no avail. 50
Waiver is an important consideration in this area. If the defendant is
the first to make reference to his willingness to submit to examination, pursuit
of this subject, usually for discrediting purposes, is less likely to be prejudicial
error.51 Some cases hold that if the defendant does not take the proper
procedural steps for preserving the error at trial, he will be foreclosed from
52
pursuing it on appeal.
The underlying premise seems to be that information as to the willingness
or refusal of the defendant to submit to a lie detector test can have a great
effect on the jury, particularly in the usual case when no expert testimony
has been offered to apprise the factfinder of the scientific qualities and
shortcomings of the polygraph. It becomes easy for the jury to assume the
accuracy of the "scientific" technique and to make the inferential leap to a
conclusion of guilt or innocence based on the defendant's attitude towards
submitting to examination.
Use of the Polygraph in Obtaining Confessions
One of the most prevalent uses of the polygraph is as a tool in the process
of obtaining confessions. The mere fact that a lie detector was used in
obtaining an otherwise voluntary confession will have no effect on its
admissibility.53 The problem lies in determining which uses of the lie
detector make a confession involuntary. Courts have excluded involuntary
confessions because they violate fundamental notions of fairness implicit
in our concept of due process, and because they have a high probability of
unreliability.r If there has been mental or physical coercion, or some
examiner action that would promote unreliability, the confession will be
excluded. 55 The cases have generally held that a confession obtained by
50. People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); Kaminski v. State, 63 So.
2d 339 (Fla. 1953); State v. Chang, 46 Hawaii 22, 374 P.2d 5 (1962); State v. Green, 254
Iowa 1379, 121 N.W.2d 89 (1963); State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962).
51. People v. Barton, 172 Cal. App. 2d 474, 341 P.2d 709 (1959); State v. Fox, 257
Iowa 174, 131 N.W.2d 684 (1964); Rodriquez v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 295, 340 S.W.2d
61 (1960).
52. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 333;
People v. Parrella, 158 Cal. App. 2d 140, 322 P.2d 83 (1958); State v. LaRocca, 81 N.J.
Super. 40, 194 A.2d 578 (Super. Ct. 1963); Marable v. State, 203 Tenn. 440, 313 S.W.2d
451 (1958).

53. United States v. McDevitt, 328 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1964); State v. Traub, 150 Conn.
169, 187 A.2d 230 (1962); Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Pinter v.
State, 203 Miss. 344, 34 So. 2d 723 (1948); Fernandez v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 68, 353
S.W.2d 434 (1962); State v. DeHart, 242 Wis. 562, 8 N.W.2d 360 (1943).
54. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENcE §824 (McNaughton
rev. 1961); Dession, supra note 40, at 335. See generally Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary"
Confession?, 17 RTrcms L. REV. 728 (1963).
55. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
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artifice or deception is admissible as long as the action is not of the type that
might induce an unreliable result.56

The courts had concentrated on the

reliability effect almost to the exclusion of notions of fairness and due process,
although they consistently expressed their distaste for these methods of
57

obtaining confessions.

The courts are now shifting to a concentration on the due process notion
of fairness, which has been enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. 58
Lisenba v. California59 supports this proposition through dictum that confessions obtained by fraud, trickery, coercion and extortion, or physical
violence violate that fundamental fairness that is essential to the concept of
justice.6° As this due process standard supplants the reliability doctrine, the
use of the lie detector in obtaining confessions will be severely qualified
where trickery or deception is involved.
Admissibility of Results of Polygraph if Reliable
Assuming the state of the science were such that the results obtained
through the polygraph were reliable, there would still be the hurdles of
hearsay, self-incrimination, and due process to clear before admission into
evidence. It is at least arguable that the testimony of the examiner would
not be excluded by the hearsay rule. The basic policy consideration underlying all hearsay exceptions is that in those situations there are certain
guarantees of trustworthiness that justify the denial of cross-examination.61
If the lie detection technique were reliable in ascertaining the truth and
falsity of the subject's responses, there would be no reason to invoke the
hearsay rule.
Whether the admission of results would violate the privilege against
self-incrimination is a more difficult question. There is some debate whether
the results of a lie detector examination are testimonial and, consequently,
whether the privilege even applies. Skolnick believes that the physiological
responses are a function of testimony.6 2 Herman, citing Wigmore, maintains

that there is testimonial compulsion present because the psysiological
reactions are predicated on the subject's knowledge of facts, and the purpose
(1941); Dession, supra note 40, at 335.
56. United States v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955) (dictum); People v. Arguello,
65 Cal. 2d 768, 423 P.2d 202, 56 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1967); Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361 (Fla.
1965); Harrison v. State, 110 Fla. 420, 148 So. 882 (1933); Denmark v. State, 95 Fla. 757, 116
So. 757 (1928); State v. Robuck, 126 Mont. 302, 248 P.2d 817 (1952); Commonwealth v.

Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962).
57. See Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 772, 789 (1965).
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 455, 457-58 (1966); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). See also Kamisar, supra note 54.
59. 314 U.S. 219 (1941). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 455, 457 (1966), further emphasizes the shift away from testing the constitutionality and admissibility of confessions by a

"voluntary-involuntary" standard.
60. 814 U.S. at 237.
61. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1420 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
62.

Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection,

70 YALE L.J. 694, 725 (1951). See also Schmerker v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966)
(dictum).
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of the interrogation is to elicit these reactions . 3 Justice Carter in his dissent
in People v. Schiers64 states that the results are testimonial because they are
communication and are therefore protected by the privilege. He argues that
the lie detector is a new and artificial method of communication. Although
the case did not deal with a lie detector, Justice Black in his concurring
opinion in Rochin v. California5 leaves the impression that he would apply
the privilege because a person is compelled to be a witness against himself
not only when he is compelled to testify, but when incriminating evidence is
forcibly taken from him by a contrivance of modem science. McCormick"
and Inbau 67 argue that the results of lie detectors are not testimonial. The
test is allegedly not a communication but a bodily demonstration, because it
is the physical responses that are the important part of the test. This question
has never been decided by the courts. A more fundamental objection to the
admission of the results of a polygraph examination is that it would violate
the policy foundations of the privilege. 68
Assuming the privilege does apply to lie detector examinations at what
point does the privilege attach? Classically, the privilege applied to legally
compelled testimony, 69 and WNigmore argued that this did not include police
interrogation.7 0 It is now clear that the privilege against self-incrimination
attaches as soon as the individual is placed in custody or otherwise deprived
of freedom of action.71 Of course, if the defendant waives the privilege by
consenting to the test 72 or if he voluntarily confesses after taking the examina73
tion, there is no question of self-incrimination.
The argument has been advanced that the admission of results of lie
detector tests would violate a defendant's guarantee of due process under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. In the
absence of affirmative case law on the subject, it may be helpful to examine
two confession cases. In Rochin v. California,4 the court held that forcefully
63. Herman, supra note 34.
64. 160 Cal. App. 2d 364, 329 P.2d 1, 3 (1958).
65. 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1952).
66. C. McCoawanc, EvwmDcE 266 (1954).
67. F. INBAU, SE.F-INcRIMINAnON 67 (1950). See also Hardman, Lie Detectors, Extrajudicial Investigations and the Courts, 48 W. VA. L. REv. 37 (1942).
68. Some of the policies that are considered to underlie the privilege against self-

incrimination are: (1) to stimulate law enforcement agencies to develop independent evidence; (2) to protect the private citizen from undue harassment by law enforcement officers

unless they have probable cause to believe that one has broken the law; (3) to insure the
dignity of the legal process; and (4) to preclude inquisitions before a person is charged,
which could lead to blackmail and oppression. See People v. Schiers,
1958); C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 136 (1954); 8 J. WIGMom, EvmECE
rev. 1961). Some commentators question the merits of these policies.
terrogation and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 Nw. U.L.
69. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE §2263 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
70. 8 J. WGMORE, EVIDENCE §2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
71. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 455 (1966).
72. People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948)
accused to be bound by his consent to take the test).
73. Cf. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
74. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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pumping the stomach of a defendant to obtain evidence "offend[ed] those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notion of justice," 75 thereby
violating the defendant's right to due process of law. Lisenba v. California76
involved an inquiry into the methods used to obtain a confession from the
defendant. The court stated in dictum that the notion of fairness is fundamental to our concept of justice. 77 Neither of these cases involve a lie
detector, but they indicate a strong reliance on the concept of fairness in
testing due process. This emphasis could cause either of two effects in lie
detector cases. The courts may look at the procedure involved in the
administration of the test and the general circumstances surrounding it to
see if there are any elements of unfairness present. Alternatively, the courts
could declare the admission of results of lie detector tests violative of due
process regardless of the circumstances. The dissent in People v. Schiers8
argues for the latter approach. A prosecution witness testified that he told
the defendant the lie detector indicated he was lying. The defendant, who
was convinced of the infallibility of the machine could not understand this
and, in fact, never retreated from his plea of innocent. No evidence was
offered as to the capability of the machine nor was it ever proved what the
results really indicated. The trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the
evidence and the district court of appeals held this was sufficient3 9 The
California supreme court denied a petition for hearing.80 Justice Carter,
in a vigorous dissent,"' emphasized the unfair methods used in administering
the test and the manner in which the evidence was presented to the court.
He also stated that the admission of lie detector test results under any
circumstances violated due process because it offended the traditions of our
law.82 The outcome of the due process argument is not clear; however, the
implications of that decision are great and will be treated in the conclusion
of this note.
TRUTH DRUGS

Historicaland Technical Background

In the late 1800's Ernest Schmidt, a German professor at the University
of Marburg, isolated a drug that he called "scopolamine." 83 It was discovered
shortly thereafter that this drug had a depressant effect and would cause
hypnosis or narcosis if a sufficient dose were administered.8 4 In the early 1900's,
German doctors began experimenting with it in obstetrics cases.8 5 It was
Id. at 169.
314 U.S. 219 (1941).
Id. at 236.
329 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1958).
People v. Schiers, 160 Cal. App. 2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 (1958).
People v. Schiers, 329 P.2d (Cal. 1958).
Id.
82. Id. at 4.
83. Geis, In Scopolamine Veritas, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 347 (1959).
84. Id. at 348.
85. Moenssens, Narcoanalysis in Law Enforcement, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 453 (1961).
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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used to place the patient in a "twilight sleep" after which she would have no
memory of the ordeal. The problem with this procedure was the difficulty
in determining the proper dosage of scopolamine. J. Christian Gaus and
Bernard Kronig developed "memory tests" that would be administered
periodically until it was determined that the patient's ability to recall was
deadened.8 6 It was the development of these tests that led to the eventual use
of truth drugs in criminal interrogation, the thought being that once con87
sciousness could be measured, reliability would be assured.
Dr. R. E. House was largely responsible for the development of the use
of scopolamine as a truth drug in criminal interrogation in the United
States.88 He discovered its effects while using the drug in his obstretrics
practice, where in one instance an unconscious patient responded accurately
to a question he asked of her husband. From 1921 to 1929, Dr. House crusaded for the acceptance of scopolamine as a substitute for the third degree
and as an aid for the mentally disturbed, but he met with limited success.8 9
During World War II and the Korean conflict, medical officers used
barbiturates as an aid in speeding recovery in cases of combat neuroses.90
The modem preference for barbiturates (sodium pentothal and sodium
amytal) is explained by the feeling that they are less toxic and produce fewer
unsatisfactory side effects. 91 The most recent developments concern the use
of these drugs in conjunction with anesthesia. Through changes in the depth
of the anesthesia and the use of additional drugs, the administrator can
manipulate the subject's mental status in order to achieve the desired results.
Attempts are being made to combine this procedure with electronic equip92
ment that will be able to gauge and direct the planes of anesthesia.
Theories advanced to describe the action of these drugs indicate that
they act as a central nervous system depressant. 93 Clinical evidence indicates
that various segments of the brain may be selectively depressed in reverse
order of their evolutional development. 94 For purposes of narco-analysis the
segments affected are the cortex, which psychiatrists generally believe performs
the discriminatory and integrative functions, and the diencephalon, which
expresses the primitive and emotional drives. 95 Through varying the levels of
depression and stimulation the examiners alter the metabolism and psychological adjustments of the subject. 96 This is by no means a totally accurate
or simple process. 97

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Gels, supra note 83, at 849.
Id. at 349-50.
Moenssens, supra note 85.
Id. at 454.
Dession, supra note 40, at 317.
Id.
Hanscom, Narco Interrogation,1 J. FoR. Sai. 37 (1956).
Dession, supra note 40, at 317.
Hanscom, supra note 92, at 40.
Id.
Dession, supra note 40, at 317.
Id.
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Referred to . . . as "truth serum," the drug used is not a serum
and ... people do not always tell the "truth" under its influence. Nor

does an understanding of the pharmacological action of the drug itself
explain its mechanism of action in any given case. The particular type
of behavior manifested under the influence of amytal is a complex
resultant of the interaction of the personality of the subject, his specific
physiological and bio-chemical reaction to it, and what is happening
to him at the time.
There is also the possibility of harmful effects and permanent damage to
the subject. 98
Admissibility of Results as Direct Evidence
Courts have invariably excluded from evidence the results of narcoanalysis and narco-interrogation. 99 As with the polygraph, the major objection
is either lack of general scientific acceptance of reliability 10° or failure of
the proponent to lay a proper foundation through expert testimony. 1 1 The
basis of this exclusionary rule, unreliability, finds great support among those
with expertise in the use and effect of these drugs. 0 2 It is generally believed
that only those who had some predilection to confess will do so under the
influence of truth drugs.10 3 Some subjects are capable of withholding information, while others fantasize, telling wild tales presumably prompted by their
subconscious and implicating themselves when in fact innocent. 0 4 A minority
decries this broadly based exclusionary rule and would prefer to have the
courts proceed from case to case in determining whether certain factors
indicating reliability are present. 05 Following the rationale of the lie detector
98. Gall, The Case Against Narcointerrogation,7 J. FOR. ScI. 29, 33 (1962). Dr. Gall
explains the mental and physical injuries that may result from the administration of truth
drugs and indicates that this damage may be permanent. Some of these are: aggravation
of heart disease, deprivation of oxygen to the brain and other vital organs, pneumonia,
peripheral nerve injuries, and death from anoxia or other complications. Dr. Gall argues
against the use of these drugs in criminal interrogation.
99. Knight v. State, 97 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1957); People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d
297 (1966); Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1965); Dugan v. Commonwealth,
333 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1960); State v. Hudson, 289 S.W. 920 (Mo. 1926); State v. Sinnott,
24 N.J. 408, 132 A.2d 298 (1957); State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952);
Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Grim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951); Orange v. Commonwealth, 191
Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950); State v. White, 60 Wash, 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962).
100. Knight v. State, 97 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1957); Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727
(Ky. 1965); State v. Hudson, 289 S.W. 920 (Mo. 1926); State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257,
243 P.2d 325 (1952).
101. Dugan v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1960); Orange v. Commonwealth,
191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950); cf. People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P.2d 1 (1951).
102. Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. CI. L. REv. 601, 606
(1947); Dession, supra note 40, at 318; Geis, supra note 83, at 356; Moenssens, supra note
85, at 456.
103. Dession, supra note 40, at 318.
104. Despres, supra note 102, at 606; Dession, supra note 40, at 318.
105. Herman, The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1 (1964).
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cases 06 it may be said -that any implication of the results of an examination
under narcosis to the jury would constitute reversible error. Implied results
can be more damaging than evidence offered directly because in the former
instance the information presented is divorced from any foundation that
would point out the shortcomings of the technique.
The effect of a stipulation to the admissibility of direct evidence obtained
through narcosis has not been settled by the courts. It seems probable that the
decisions will follow the trend of admission in polygraph cases. °7 One court
has implied that had the stipulation extended to the admissibility of the
evidence and not just to submission to examination, the results would have
been admissible.' 08 Again, 109 the difficulty with this approach is that the
stipulation does nothing to correct the defect of unreliability. A better
approach would follow Valdez v. State,'" which dealt with stipulations in lie
detector cases. This approach squarely meets the reliability problem and
would prevent injustice to one who erroneously believed in the accuracy of
the technique and submitted himself to examination to prove his innocence.
Admissibility of Expert PsychiatricEvidence of Personality Traits
Based on Narco-Analysis
There has been much controversy about the use of expert psychiatric
evidence concerning personality traits.," The focus of the controversy is the
character evidence rule, which directs that proof of good character can be
adduced only by evidence as to the defendant's general reputation in the
community. Evidence of particular facts or of an individual's opinion of the
defendant's disposition in regard to the particular trait concerned is not
admissible. 1 2 Led by Wigmore,":8 much criticism has been directed toward
this rule of evidence. In one of the first cases admitting this type of evidence 4
the trial judge allowed into evidence psychiatric testimony which indicated
that the chief prosecution witness was a psychopath with a tendency towards
making false accusations.
If the psychiatrist has utilized narcosis in his examination the problem is
further complicated. An analysis of leading cases indicates variant views.
In People v. Ford"5 the issue before the court was the ability of the defendant
to form the requisite premeditative intent. The psychiatrist had interviewed
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

E.q., State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J. Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (Super. Ct. 1961).
See cases cited note 35 supra.
Orange v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 439, 61 S.E.2d 267, 274 (1950).
See discussion concerning stipulations in polygraph cases notes 35-42 supra.
91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).

111. Curran, Expert Psychiatric Evidence of Personality Traits, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 999
(1955); Falnor & Steffen, Evidence of Character: From the "Crucible of the Community"
to the "Couch of the Psychiatrist," 102 U. PA. L. REv. 980 (1954).
112.
§§1980,
113.
114.
115.

Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (dictum); 7 J.
1981, 1983 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
7 J. WIGMoRE, EvmENcF §1986 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595, 105 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1952).
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the defendant on three occasions, one of which involved the use of narcosis.
Relying upon lack of judicial precedent the trial court prevented the psychiatrist from testifying as to the interview in which drugs were used. The New
York Court of Appeals"" affirmed this decision. The psychiatrist was allowed
to testify as to his findings derived from the other two examinations. The
California supreme court has permitted a psychiatrist to testify that the
defendant was not a sexual deviate. 11" The psychiatrist had interviewed the
defendant under narcosis, and the court stated that the results of examinations under narcosis were inadmissible only when they were used to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. The court grounded its decision on statutory
interpretation, stating there had been a legislative determination that persons
found to be sexual psychopaths were more likely to violate sexual psychopath
laws than those without such propensities. Thus, evidence of character was
relevant to show the defendant's disposition."" It is not clear whether the
court would have reached this result without the aid of a statute, but the
broad statement referring to the admissibility of the results of truth serum
tests remains intact. In State v. White" 9 the defendant attempted to prove
by expert psychiatric testimony that he was psychotic. The court excluded
statements made by the defendant while under narcosis but permitted the
psychiatrist to present his findings based on the same examination.
The New Jersey supreme court affirmed the exclusion of expert psychiatric
testimony that the defendant was not a sexual deviate and did not have the
capacity to commit sodomy.1 2 0 The defendant had been examined under

narcosis. The court excluded the evidence on the grounds that it violated
the character evidence rule and that the efficacy of truth serum had not been
recognized. Thus, four different approaches have emerged:
1 21
(1) Expert psychiatric testimony of personality traits is inadmissible.
except when based on interviews
(2) The exidence is admissible
22
conducted under narcosis.'
(3) The evidence is admissible even when the interview was conthe statements made by the defendant
ducted under narcosis; however,
23
while under narcosis are not.
(4) The evidence is admissible even when the interview was conducted
under narcosis and the statements made by the defendant while under
long as they are not used to prove the
narcosis are also admissible 2 so
4
truth of the matter asserted.

116. Id.
117. People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954).
118. Id. at 223, 266 P.2d at 42.
119. 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962).
120. State v. Sinnott, 24 N.J. 408, 132 A.2d 298 (1957).
121. Id.
122. People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595, 105 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1952).
123. State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962).
124. People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954). It should be pointed out that
cases that have admitted this type of evidence have dealt with crimes that psychiatrists
believe carry certain isolated and identifiable personality traits.
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A leading article on the subject indicates that narcosis can be a useful
adjunct to a complete psychiatric analysis of the subject's mental condition
and personality structure. 1 25 When used as an auxiliary technique "the results
have acquired enough reliability in the field of medical psychology to be
recognized as bases for an expert opinion."' 26 Although it is difficult to
predict how cases in this area will be decided, it can be said that in most
instances the dual hurdles of the character evidence rule and the reliability
problem of truth serum will have to be overcome.
Admissibility of Expert Psychiatric Evidence of Sanity
Based on Narco-Analysis
A closely related problem is the admissibility of psychiatric testimony
on the issue of defendant's sanity when the expert's opinion is based in
part on narco-analysis. Two recent cases have admitted this type of evidence.12 7 The court in People v. Cartier128 permitted the psychiatrist to give
an opinion based on narco-analysis of defendant's sanity. Statements made
by the defendant while under narcosis were also admitted on the theory
that they were not offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter
asserted but rather to provide insight into the basis of the psychiatrist's
opinion. In People v. Myers, 29 while permitting the psychiatrist to testify
to his findings, the court did not admit the statements made by the accused
under narcosis. If the defendant voluntarily submits to the examination and
the results are unfavorable, the question arises whether the physician-patient
privilege applies. The privilege should not apply because it exists only where
the physician has been consulted in his professional capacity with a view
towards curative treatment. 3 0
One court had admitted testimony based partly on narcosis where the
examination was involuntary.13 ' The results were unfavorable to the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals held that this did not violate the
privilege because defendants had waived it when they pleaded insanity as a
defense. Inbau suggests that a compulsory examination would not violate
the privilege because it protects the defendant only from supplying any
testimonial link in the chain of evidence necessary to show that he committed
the crime in question. An investigation into mental responsibility would not
fall within this protection unless the subject was required to discuss the
32
crime.

125.

Curran, supra note 111, at 1014.

126. Dession, supra note 40, at 342.
127. People v. Carder, 51 Cal. 2d 520, 335 P.2d 114 (1959); People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d
311, 220 N.E2d 297 (1966).
128. 51 Cal. 2d 520, 335 P.2d 114 (1959).
129. 35 IMI. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d 297 (1966).

130. Dession, supra note 40, at 325.
131. People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d 925 (1942).
132. F. INBAU, SELF-INcRIMINATION 52-61 (1950).
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Admissibility of Results of Truth Drugs if Reliable
Assuming that narcosis was found to be reliable enough for court use,
questions as to the admissibility of the results, when used to prove the truth
of the matter asserted, must be tested by due process and the privilege against
self-incrimination. Since evidence obtained from a person under the influence
of narcosis is testimonial, the privilege against self-incrimination would
apply,133 and if incriminating evidence were obtained during an involuntary
examination under truth drugs or an examination conducted without Miranda
warnings, it would be excluded either under the privilege against selfincrimination or the confession rule. If the examination under narcosis were
voluntary, it is probable that the waiver doctrine would operate to admit
the results..3 This proposition deserves closer scrutiny. Many of the previously advanced arguments pertaining to the polygraph are applicable to
narcosis but apply more forcefully. The doctrine of waiver presupposes man's
essential rationality, 135 yet irrationality plays an important role in man's
mental processes. 3 6 Since narcosis probes the unconscious and subconscious
mind of the defendant, he can have no concept of the scope of his waiver.
He has left himself helpless in the hands of the examiner who is free to
probe as he sees fit, possibly into areas of which the defendant is not even
consciously aware.
Under more conventional examination procedures, even if the subject
has waived his privilege against self-incrimination, he is still free to discriminate consciously as to the content of his answers and the subject areas
covered. In the case of narcosis the undeterminable scope of the waiver
should make it inoperative. It is also arguable that the concepts expressed
in Rochin v. California"' are applicable to a voluntary narcosis examination.
Such expressions of due process as "those personal immunities so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
and "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
...
justice of English-speaking people .... 138 are pertinent.
The privacy and integrity of one's mind, and the concept of our system
of law as adversarial would seem to be protected by this philosophy of due
process.
'

133.
134.
686, 193
135.
(1956).
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 69; Despres, supra note 102.
Cf. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d
P.2d 927 (1948).
See Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARV. L. REv. 683
Id. at 692.
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Id. at 169.
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HYPNOSIS

Historical and Technical Background
Unlike the polygraph and truth drugs, the practice of hypnotism is an
ancient art. Ladd maintains that it is as old as human history and is nearly
as widespread as the race itself. 39 Despite modem research, the true nature
of hypnosis is unknown, and none of the theories presently advanced cover
all of its phenomena adequately. 40 It will be helpful, however, to examine
briefly one theory. Kubie and Margolin contend that hypnosis is a threestage process. 41 The first of these is the induction stage. This consists of a
progressive elimination of all the subject's sensori-motor contacts with the
outside world except that with the hypnotist. This is likened to the role parents play in the psychology of a newborn child. The hypnotist becomes the sole
representative of and contact with the outside world. In the second phase,
the reduction of these contacts to the one between the subject and the
hypnotist obliterates the ego boundaries of the subject and constructs them
causing a psychological fusion of the hypnotist and subject. To the subject,
the words of the hypnotist become indistinguishable from his own thoughts.
The third stage of a fully developed hypnotic state consists of a reexpansion
of ego boundaries and the incorporation of a "fragmentary image" of the
hypnotist in that ego. The subject has reestablished contact with the world
and all of his sensori-motor contacts have reactivated. The hypnotist's influence then operates from within through his incorporated image, which echoes
his voice commands. This is accomplished without the subject being aware
of it. This process is compared to the ego development in an infant where
the ego retains parental images as unconscious incorporated components.
Physiologically, the reduction of the sensori-motor contacts increases the
subject's capacity for concentration, creating a state of maximum attention.
This to some extent explains the increased ability for recollection. Psychologically, the creation of the hypnotic state depends on a diminution of alertness through eliminating fears and other personal defenses in order to
facilitate the reduction of the sensori-motor contacts. Kubie and Margolin
maintain that the hypnotic process is a recapitulation of the most important
and complex psychological evolution of infancy and in effect is "an experi142
mental reproduction of a natural development process."'
Admissibility of Results as Direct Evidence
Many of the problems attendant to the use of truth drugs are also present
with hypnosis. Hypnotic responses cannot be relied upon as factually
139. Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 174 (1902). For a general

historical background see TnE NATuRE OF HYPNOSIS (P. Shor & M. Orne ed. 1965).
140. A. MnEAms, A Sys= OF MEDICAL HYPNOSIS 56 (1960).
141. Kubie & Margolin, The Process of Hypnotism and the Nature of the Hypnotic
State, in THE NxruRE OF HYPNOSIS 217 (R. Shor &cM. Orne ed. 1965).
142. Id. at 232.
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truthful.' 4 3 Subjects tend to weave webs of fantasy as well as exercise some
positive control over their responses.1 4 4 Some are able to resist answering
questions at will. It is also possible for the subject to feign the hypnotic state
and this, in many instances, cannot be detected by the hypnotist. 145 A major
factor in the unreliability of hypnosis as to factual truth is the suggestibility of
the subject. 46 This presents extreme interpretive difficulties. Rather than
answering the question truthfully, the subject may have detected the answer
desired by the examiner. Through the examiner's manner or the relationship between examiner and the subject, the subject may assume the philosophy
and impressions of the hypnotist. For example, if the hypnotist believes the
subject is guilty, his feeling may be translated into the response of the
subject. If the examiner is unaware of the source of the response and its
1 7
meaning to the subject, his conclusions may be inaccurate. 4
There have been few cases concerning hypnotism and the court's acceptance of it. Hypnosis and narcosis are related, however, in the respect that
the subject's critical faculties are impaired. Additionally, the reliability
problems of hypnosis, narcosis, and the polygraph are similar, permitting
the gaps in the case law on hypnosis to be filled by analogy to the other two
areas. When results of an examination under hypnosis have been offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, they have been uniformly excluded
by the courts. 4 8 This is consistent with the approach taken in the truth
serum 4 9 and lie detector' 50 cases. Again, the reason advanced for the
exclusion is the lack of general scientific acceptance of the reliability of
hypnosis in ascertaining truth and falsity.' 5 ' The courts find support from
the experts who readily point out the shortcomings of hypnosis for deter52
mining factual truth.1
Although there appear to be no cases on the subject, stipulation by the
parties to the administration of a hypnotic examination and to the admissibility of its results would probably be given effect by the courts. As
indicated by Orange v. Commonwealth,'15 it is important that the stipulation extend to the admissibility of the results rather than simply to the
administration of the examination.

143. Herman, supra note 195, at 26; Levin, Hypnosis in the Law, 1964 INs. LJ. 97, 102;
Note, Hypnosis as an Evidenciary Tool, 8 UTAH L. Ray. 78, 79 (1962).
144. A. MEAREs, supra note 140, at 374.
145. Note, supra note 143, at 82.
146. A. MFARs, supra note 140, at 13-33.
147. Note, supra note 143, at 81.
148. People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897); People v. Marsh, 170 Cal. App.
2d 284, 338 P.2d 495 (1959); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950); Rex v.
Booher, [1928] 4 D.L.R. 795 (Alta. S.C.).
149. See cases cited notes 21, 22 supra.
150. See cases cited note 99 supra.
151. State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950); George, Scientific Investigation and Defendant's Rights, 57 Micn. L. REv. 37 (1958).
152. A. MEARS, supra note 140, at 374.
153. 191 Va. 423, 439, 61 S.E.2d 267, 274 (1950).
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HYPNOSIS, TRUTH DRUGS, AND THE POLYGRAPH

Admissibility of Expert Psychiatric Evidence of Personality
Traits and Sanity Based on Hypnosis
In the area of expert psychiatric evidence of personality traits and sanity
the California supreme court has recognized that hypnosis is an accepted
analytical tool in -the psychiatric determination of state of mind. 54 Admission
of the evidence was predicated on its reliability as an analytical tool and
proof that the hypnotist was qualified. The court also indicated that it was
within the trial court's discretion to permit a recording of defendant's examination under hypnosis to be played to the court. This result is consistent
with California's position on the admissibility of this type of evidence when
truth drugs are involved.155 It seems likely that most jurisdictions will follow
the pattern of their truth drug cases.' 56
The question of whether a defendant has the right to consult with a
hypnotist in the preparation of his defense has been treated in two cases
with seemingly contrary results. In Cornell v. Superior Court,'5 7 the California supreme court held that the trial" judge abused his discretion when
he prevented the defendant from consulting with a hypnotist. The defendant,
who was accused of murder and awaiting trial, claimed no recollection of
his activities at the critical time and wished to. undergo hypnosis in order
to stimulate his memory. The Ohio supreme court held that Dr. Sam Sheppard was not entitled to consult with a hypnotist in order to aid his
recollection. 5 The court stressed, however, that Sheppard had already been
convicted, and the two cases may be distinguished on this point.
Admissibility of Results of Hypnosis if Reliable
Assuming the results obtained were reliable, there would still be objections to their admissibility similar to those advanced in the case of the polygraph and truth drugs. If the hypnosis is not submitted to as a matter of
choice and a confession is induced thereby, dearly this should be held violative
of due process as an involuntary confession. The United States Supreme
Court in Leyra v. Denno, 59 although sidestepping the hypnosis issue, seems
to provide for this result. 60 If the defendant voluntarily submitted to
154. People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963).
155. People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954).
156. People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d 297 (1966); State v. Sinnott, 24 N.J.
408, 132 A.2d 298 (1957); People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 107 NXE.2d 595 (1952); State v.
White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962).

157. 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959).
158. Sheppard v. Koblentz, 174 Ohio St. 120, 187 N.E.2d 40 (1962).

159. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
160. "First, an already physically and emotionally exhausted suspect's ability to resist
interrogation was broken to almost trance-like submission by use of the arts of a highly
skilled psychiatrist. Then the confession petitioner began making to the psychiatrist was
filled in and perfected by additional statements given in rapid succession to a police
officer, a trusted friend, and two state prosecutors. We hold that use of confessions extracted in such a manner from a lone defendant unprotected by counsel is not consistent
with due process of law as required by our Constitution." Id. at 561.
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examination under hypnosis, it is possible that the evidence obtained would
be admissible under the waiver doctrine; however, the arguments previously
advanced against the admission of results in truth drug cases are still
applicable.
CONCLUSION

It is apparent that hypnosis, truth drugs, and the polygraph perform
valuable functions and have carved a permanent place for themselves in the
law. This is particularly true of truth drugs and hypnosis, which have been
proved to be useful adjuncts in the determination of such questions as
personality traits and sanity. As these tools become increasingly more acceptable to the courts, a word of caution is necessary. It is conceivable that these
techniques will eventually develop to such an extent that there will be no
question as to their reliability in ascertaining factual truth. If this stage is
reached, close legal reasoning might provide as follows: Since these tools
have been accorded general scientific acceptance as to their reliability in
ascertaining factual truth, and if the examination were voluntary, the results
should be admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted. This
solution is deceptively simple. Consider the plight of the defendant, who,
regardless of his motive, refuses to submit to an examination by one of these
techniques. In the eyes of the factfinders he would be considered guilty.
There would be no effective way to keep this refusal from the jury. As soon
as the jury realized that evidence of the results of one of these tests was not
going to be offered, the defendant's conviction would be assured. Certainly
any innocent party would offer evidence that would exonerate him. The
forum then would shift from the court to the laboratory, leaving to the
judge the function of setting the penalty and to the jury no function at all.
The argument has been advanced that the person who wishes or demands
to take the test to prove his innocence should have the right to do so.
Admittedly, the interests have to be balanced, but the law already affords the
innocent party enough protection if the system operates properly.
The admission of the results of these tests as proof of the truth of the
matter asserted would revolutionize our whole system of trials and philosophy
of administration of justice. Instead of being an adversary system it would
become inquisitorial with the defendant becoming its object rather than a
party. Truth is not the sine qua non of our system of justice. The fourth
and fifth amendments are but two examples of the sacrifice of efficient
methods for ascertaining truth to protect the more treasured values of personal
dignity and privacy. The probing into and the manipulation of man's mind
is foreign to these values and caution should be exercised before these
scientific investigatory tools are afforded unqualified judicial acceptance.
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